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Abstract:  
This paper examines the potential for location-based employment tax incentives to have a 
differential effect on establishment location and employment across industry sectors.  We model 
the differential effect of the location-based federal Empowerment Zone (EZ) wage tax credit on 
equilibrium labor and total cost savings across industry sectors.  The model guides our empirical 
work, as we test the effect of the program across industry sectors.  Our empirical analysis shows 
that location based-tax incentives have a positive effect on firm location in some of the industries 
our model predicts and a negative effect in industries that could be crowded out. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Offering tax incentives to firms is part of the state and local policy maker’s tool kit used 
to attract or maintain economic activity in a jurisdiction.  The motivation behind these policies is 
debatable, but whether or not they succeed in attracting or maintaining economic activity within 
the targeted area is an empirical question.  Academic research on the success of location based 
tax policy is mixed, with several studies finding positive effects (Papke (1994), Busso and Kline 
(2006), Billings (2008), Krupka and Noonan (2009)) and others finding small or no net effects 
(Boarnet and Bogart (1996), Bondonio and Engberg (2000), Greenbaum and Engberg (2004), 
Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007), Elvery (2009), Hanson (2009), Neumark and Kolko (2010)).
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The goal of this paper is to determine if location-based tax policy has a differential effect 
across industry sectors.  If location-based policy has a heterogeneous effect across industry 
sectors it could help explain some of the tension in the previous literature.  The mixed results in 
previous findings could be driven by studying policies that are targeted to areas with different 
industry portfolios, or by policy design that induces industry-level churning among firms in the 
targeted area. 
We use a simple model to show the differential impact of the location-based 
Empowerment Zone (EZ) tax credit across industry sectors.  Our model shows varying the 
ability to substitute between capital and labor results in a differential effect of the EZ tax credit 
on the firm’s equilibrium labor and total cost of production.  The predictions of the model guide 
our empirical work as we use the assignment of the federal EZ to test the effect of the program 
on employment and location of firms across industry sectors that vary based on ability to 
substitute between capital and labor.  The EZ tax incentives offer a unique opportunity to 
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identify these effects, as administration of the program created a pool of applicant areas: some 
that received the program benefits, others that did not. 
  We use data from the Dun and Bradstreet survey of firms to estimate the effect of 
location-based tax incentives across industry types and by ability to substitute between capital 
and labor.  Our results show that firms in industries our model predicts to have the largest 
reduction in total cost have an increased presence in EZ designated areas.  Estimating the effect 
of the tax incentives across industries, we find in the short-term the retail and service sectors 
benefited most from the program, increasing the share of establishments in the designated area 
by between .16 and .30 percentage points.  We find evidence that the gains from the program in 
some sectors were offset by losses in other sectors, as the share of establishments in the 
transportation and finance, insurance, and real estate industries declined by between .16 and .19 
percentage points.   
We also find that in the longer-term the share of employment increases in sectors that our 
model predicts will benefit most from the EZ tax incentives; while it declines for sectors that our 
model predicts will benefit least.  We test the robustness of our industry-specific findings by 
estimating the effect of location based tax incentives across industries clustered by their ability to 
substitute between labor and capital and find that the empirical results fit the model prediction 
quite well.  In addition, because of the potential for endogeneity of the EZ tax incentives, we use 
an instrumental variables regression where the political representation of areas in our sample 
determines EZ status.  The results of our instrumental variables regressions largely confirm our 
OLS findings that the EZ tax incentives have a heterogeneous effect across industry sectors 
according to the degree of capital-labor substitutability. 
2. EZ WAGE TAX CREDIT: PROGRAM BACKGROUND AND MODEL 
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The federal government began offering a location-based set of incentives called the 
Empowerment Zone (EZ) program to firms willing to operate in and hire residents of parts of 
designated inner city and rural areas.  EZs were chosen from a group of applications made by 
state and local governments.  Applications were accepted from areas where at least 20 percent of 
the population lived in poverty and 6.3 percent were unemployed (GAO, 2004).  From 78 
nominees (Wallace, 2004), the federal government awarded EZ status to parts of 6 cities 
(Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia/Camden, New York) and 3 rural areas 
(Kentucky Highlands, Mississippi Delta, and the Rio Grande Valley in Texas). 
The original designation began in 1995 and provided tax-preferred status for ten years 
ending in 2005, however Congress extended the sunset to the end of 2009 with the Community 
Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 (P.L 106-554).  In addition to the six original urban EZs, the 
program expanded to include subsequent designations in 1998 and 2001.  The EZ program is 
primarily a set of tax incentives claimed by employers, but also included a one-time allocation of 
$100 million in the form of Social Service Block Grant funds for each designated urban area 
($40 million for rural areas).  The EZ tax incentives include some small incentives to invest in 
capital, including: increasing the amount of property that can be immediately expensed, 
excluding capital gains on the sale of certain assets, and excluding capital gains on the sale of 
some small business stock. 
The main component of the EZ program is a wage tax credit.
 2
  An employer operating in 
the EZ can claim a tax credit for wages paid to an employee who resides within EZ boundaries.  
The EZ program has no requirement on type or tenure of the employer or employee, and no 
restriction on firms who relocate to the zone- any employer can claim the credit as long as they 
(and their employee) operate within the EZ boundaries.  The amount of the credit is 20 percent of 
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the first $15,000 in wages paid, for a maximum credit of $3,000 per employee.  Qualified 
employees must live in census tract areas designated as EZs and perform most of their work 
within the EZ.  The EZ wage credit can only be claimed for an employee if the employee has 
worked at least 90 days; there is, however, no upper bound on the tenure of an employee (IRS, 
2004).  Many of the nominees that did not receive an EZ designation became part of a less 
generous location-based incentive program called Enterprise Communities (EC) that did not 
include the wage tax credit.
3
    
Previous work has modeled the effect of zone-based wage subsidies on employment 
outcomes, including Gravelle (1992), Papke (1993), Moore (2001) and McGuire and Garica-
Mila (2002).  We use a simple cost minimization model where the firm minimizes total cost (TC) 
of production for a given level of output (x).  For illustrative purposes, we assume production 
follows a Cobb-Douglas function for a given level of technology (A) and two inputs capital (K) 
and labor (L) to illustrate how the wage subsidy can have a differential effect on firms across 
different industries.  The price of one unit of labor is represented by w, and the price of one unit 
of capital is represented by r.  The model is characterized by the following problem: 
min TC = wL + rK  (1) 
s.t  x = AK
α
L
β
, 
where we assume constant returns to scale, or that α + β = 1 and α > 0, β > 0.  Solving this 
simple cost minimization problem yields the following solutions for the optimal level of capital 
and labor: 
K
*
 = (αw/βr)β/α+β (x/A)1/α+β  (2) 
L
*
 = 
 (βr/αw)α/α+β (x/A)1/α+β  (3) 
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This model can be adapted to include the EZ wage tax credit to facilitate comparison across 
types of firms.  The EZ wage tax credit is set by statute at 20 percent of wages paid, however for 
flexibility of the model we include a tax credit of rate t.
4
 
min TC = w(1-t)L + rK  (4) 
s.t  x = AK
α
L
β
 
Solving the cost minimization problem with the wage tax credit yields the following solutions for 
the optimal level of capital and labor: 
KEZ
*
 = (αw(1-t)/βr)β/α+β (x/A)1/α+β  (5) 
LEZ
*
 = 
 (βr/αw(1-t))α/α+β (x/A)1/α+β  (6) 
For any positive tax credit, t, KEZ
*
 < K
*
, and LEZ
*
 > L
*
, but the degree of this difference depends 
on the production parameters α and β.  In addition, total cost in equilibrium will be lower with 
the tax credit than without and the degree of the difference between the total cost in each case 
will depend on the production parameters α and β. 
The α and β parameters define the degree of substitutability between capital and labor for 
any given level of production.  By varying α and β in the production function, we can 
demonstrate the sensitivity to the wage tax credit of firms in industries with varying degrees of 
capital-labor substitutability.  This simple model allows us to simulate two important effects of 
the tax credit across values of α; first, the expected change in the equilibrium level of labor and 
second, the expected reduction in the total cost of production to the firm. 
To demonstrate this effect, we simulate the introduction of a 20 percent wage tax credit 
(the statutory amount of the EZ wage tax credit) for a given wage, rental price of capital, level of 
output, and level of technology for a range of firms with different ability to substitute between 
labor and capital (varying the α and β parameters).  The results of the simulations are 
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summarized by value of α in Figure 1.  Figure 1 shows the change in equilibrium labor and the 
reduction in total cost that results from the introduction of a twenty percent wage tax credit 
across the range of values for α. 
The simulation results demonstrate the tax credit will cause the largest increase in 
equilibrium labor for firms in industries that can easily substitute between capital and labor (a 
value of α close to one-half).  The simulation results also show that the tax credit will result in a 
much smaller increase in equilibrium labor by firms in industries that are less able to substitute 
(value of α close to zero or one).     
Figure 1 shows that the expected reduction in total cost is driven by two factors.  The first 
is that the wage tax credit causes substitution toward labor for firms that are able to substitute (α 
close to one-half), which reduces total costs.  The second is that the wage tax credit decreases 
total costs more to firms that have less ability to substitute away from labor (α<.5), or are more 
labor intensive, because they use more labor in equilibrium.  The simulations show that the wage 
tax credit will reduce total cost most for firms with a value of α around 0.25. 
The relationship between the reduction in total cost and the value of α demonstrates that 
the wage tax credit will be more valuable to firms that have relatively little ability to substitute 
away from labor.  We expect that because the EZ wage tax credit is targeted based on the 
geographic location of the firm, firms in industries that stand to have the largest reduction in total 
cost would be more willing to pay to relocate to the designated EZ areas.  Because the EZ 
designated areas are limited to a few square miles in each city, firms in industries with a smaller 
reduction in total cost (α >.5) may be outbid for land in the zone by firms that stand to gain more 
from the credit.  Heterogeneous value of the EZ wage tax credit across industries makes it 
possible that the designation of the zone pushes some types of firms out of the area in favor of 
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those that stand to have a larger cost reduction under the program.  The potential crowding out of 
firms that would increase equilibrium labor the most by firms in industries that have the largest 
reduction in total cost does not mean that employment will not increase as a result of the subsidy.  
Firms in industries that have the largest reduction in total cost will also increase employment and 
will be more likely to enter the EZ area to take advantage of the wage tax credit.
5
 
 To map the predictions our model makes about industries with varying degrees of α, we 
need a measure of this parameter.  The α parameter in our model is the degree of substitutability 
between capital and labor in the production process for a given industry, which cannot be 
observed.  Instead, we rely on an approximation to represent this parameter following Ghosal 
(1991).  Our approximation of α is the equilibrium ratio of capital costs to total costs in an 
industry or:   
αi = Ki / (Li + Ki)  (7)
 
where L is the total labor cost of  production for industry i and K is the total capital cost by 
production for industry i.  Our data on labor and capital costs come from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) National Economic Accounts.
6
  We use private equipment and 
software expenses by industry as our measure of capital costs and total compensation of 
employees by industry as our measure of labor costs.
7
  Table 1 shows the value of α for each of 
the industries in our sample at the one-digit SIC industry level. 
3. TESTING THE MODEL PREDICTIONS ACROSS INDUSTRY SECTORS 
To identify the effect of the EZ tax incentives across industries we use a differencing 
methodology to build a counterfactual for what would have happened in the absence of the 
program benefits.  Following Hanson (2009), our strategy is to compare how the share of firms 
in an industry (or employment in that industry) changes between EZ areas and the larger city 
8 
 
they are a part of with EC areas and the larger city they are part of and test how the introduction 
of the program changes this difference- a triple difference or DDD strategy.   
The two main reasons for estimating with the DDD strategy are 1) to create a reasonable 
counterfactual for what would have happened in EZ areas in the absence of the program, and 2) 
to reduce endogeneity and omitted variable bias.  The EC areas make a reasonable counterfactual 
for what might have happened in EZ areas because they met the criteria necessary to become an 
EZ, but were not selected for the program.  The perfect counter-factual for measuring the effect 
of the EZ program would be to know what would have happened in designated areas had the EZ 
never been assigned there.  Because the EZ must be assigned to a particular area or group of 
areas, this is not possible.  We use the EC areas to provide the best possible counter-factual for 
EZ assignment.  By using the EC areas and differencing with the larger city we eliminate many 
of the concerns that arise when using simple before and after comparisons or comparisons with 
similar areas.  Also, because EC areas were granted some of the benefits of the EZ areas, but not 
the wage tax credit, they can be used to isolate this effect.
8
   
This design reduces endogeneity and omitted variables bias concerns by isolating the 
effect of the EZ from city fixed effects because it makes an across-time comparison.  It also 
isolates the effect of the EZ from time-variant, city-wide effects because it makes an intra-city 
comparison.  Thus, the error term in our regression will only include factors that change across 
time.  The comparison group used is similar to the EZ areas but is not likely subject to negative 
(or positive) effects from the policy because they are made up of tracts located in different cities 
than the EZs.  Because both the comparison and treatment groups applied for EZ designation and 
met the requirements for unemployment and poverty, there will be no unobservable differences 
caused from going through the application process or being qualified. 
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By using this method, we assume that the difference between what happened in the EC areas 
and their larger city across time is what would have happened to the EZ areas in the absence of 
the program.  We are not assuming that the EZ and EC areas would have grown the same; we are 
assuming that the difference between these areas and their surrounding cities would have grown 
the same in the absence of the tax incentives. 
To implement the DDD strategy econometrically, we start with a full model that includes 
tract and city fixed effects as well as city wide trends.  We then show how our DDD strategy 
eliminates these from our estimating equation.  The full model consists of two equations, one 
explaining census tract level changes and the other explaining city level changes, we then 
difference the two equations for our estimating equation. 
Yi,n,t = α + βEZn,t + Xi,n,tδ + θn + πn,t + πc⊇n,t + u i,n,t  (8) 
Yc,n,t = α + Xc,n,tδ + θc + πc,t + u c,n,t  (9) 
where i indexes a two digit SIC industry, and n indexes the census tract, t indexes time, and c 
indexes a specific city.  These equations also show city and tract specific time trends denoted by 
the π parameters, and city and tract specific fixed effects, denoted by the θ parameters.  Taking 
first differences in each equation eliminates the city and tract fixed effects to yield: 
∆Yi,n = α + βEZn + Xi,nδ + πn + πc + u i,n  (10) 
∆Yc,n = α + Xc,nδ + πc + u c,n  (11) 
Notice that the tract and city fixed effects drop out after taking the difference across time, 
and the time subscript, t, is no longer necessary because we have only a before and after 
comparison.  Taking the difference between (4) and (5) eliminates the city-specific time trend 
and yields the estimating equation used to determine the effect of the tax incentives on 
establishment location:
9
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∆Yi,n - ∆Yc,n = α + βEZn + Xi,nδ + πn + u i,n  (12) 
Where we combine the intercepts and error term for convenience and X includes city and 
tract level control variables.  Notice that we do not observe πn, so that it is relegated to the error 
term in our regressions- we will address this issue when we estimate using instrumental 
variables.   
The outcome variable, Y, is either the share of total establishments in a census tract that a 
given industry represents or the share of total employment in a census tract that a given industry 
represents, and is differenced as shown above.  Initially, we use data on the share of firms and 
employees for 1996 (one year after the EZ began) as the treatment year, and 1994 (one year 
before the EZ began) to test the short-term effect of the program.  We also test a longer term 
impact of the program by using data on the share of firms and employees for 2000 as the 
treatment year.
10
 
  Our unit of observation is a two-digit SIC industry in a given census tract.
 11
   Both EZ 
and EC areas are defined by census tract boundaries, and a given EZ or EC area consists of a 
group of several census tracts (the exact number varies by zone).  The Census Bureau defines 
census tracts as statistical subdivisions of counties.  Tracts average 4,000 inhabitants, ranging 
from 2,500 to 8,000 inhabitants.  Because the primary concern in defining tracts is the 
population, the land area of tracts varies widely, but for densely populated urban areas they are 
usually quite small (many census tracts in New York city cover only a few square blocks).  Both 
EZ and EC areas are a small part of their respective surrounding cities- between 2 and 17 percent 
of total land area.   
 The differencing method reduces the need for control variables as factors that are 
constant in the area will cancel out with the difference across time.  Other city specific time 
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trends cancel out with the difference between the EZ (or EC ) area and the surrounding city.  We 
control for a set of industry dummy variables to account for changes that may occur in specific 
industries that are unique to particular areas (different between the city and EZ/EC).  The Dun 
and Bradstreet does not contain other demographic information that may be of interest as control 
variables, however we believe that many of these variables (education of population, racial mix 
of residents, income) may not be appropriate to control for as they could also be outcomes of the 
EZ program and therefore may bias the EZ coefficient in (6).
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 The primary difference in the identification strategy presented here and previous research 
is the manner in which we build a counterfactual and our ability to treat zone designation as an 
endogenous variable.  Research that examines the effect of state-level geographically targeted 
tax incentives includes Papke (1994), Boarnet and Bogart (1996), Bostic and Prohofsky (1996), 
Bondonio and Engberg (2000),  Bondonio (2002), and Greenbaum and Engberg (2004) for 
reviews of these and other studies see Bartik (1992), Wasylenko (1997), Buss (2001), and 
Hanson (2009).  In addition, Billings (2008) examines the possibility for the Colorado Enterprise 
Zone program to have a differential effect across industry sectors.  Other research examines the 
differential outcome of location based policy across areas that differ in ways that may interact 
with the policy in question, such as the previous level of agglomeration (Devereux, Griffith, and 
Simpson (2007)).     
4. DATA 
The unit of analysis in our data is the census tract, and our data source for the number of 
business establishments in a census tract is the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) Marketplace 
database.
13
  The data consist of the fourth quarter survey from the years 1994, 1996, and 2000.  
These data contain a wealth of establishment information, including employment, sales, years of 
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service, the location of the establishment at the zip code level, and the two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code.  The SIC system was created by the U.S. government as a 
way to broadly categorize firms according to industry.  The D&B data have been used sparingly 
in academic literature compared to other data, as only a hand-full of   previous studies use this 
data including Kolko and Neumark (2008), Rosenthal and Strange (2003), Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1995), Carlton (1983), and Evans (1987).   
The D&B data are aggregated at the zip code level.  To map the zip code level data on local 
establishments to census tracts, we use a correspondence to match the geography of the EZ and 
EC designated areas.  The correspondence determines what percent of each zip code lies in a 
given census tract and assigns that percent of zip code employment or establishments to the 
census tract.
14
  Our list of EZ and EC census tracts was obtained through personal 
correspondence with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and is also partially 
available through that department’s webpage.  Each EZ or EC designated area is made of several 
census tracts, we treat census tracts as the unit of observation- not an entire EZ or EC, which 
would severely limit the number of observations in our data.   
We create our dependent variable from the D&B data.  We measure establishment location 
as the share of the total number of establishments that each industry represents in a census tract.  
We measure industry level employment as the share of the total number of employees 
(employees of establishments located in the census tract) that each industry represents in a 
census tract.  We use the share rather than the total number for two reasons.  First, because the 
D&B are a sample of businesses, it is possible that parts of cities are under-represented.  If this is 
true and the under-representation is uniform across industries, then using the share of firms will 
mitigate under-sampling concerns.   
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Second, the EZ program may cause firms in particular industries to remain in operation at 
the expense of those in other industries.  By looking at the share of total business activity that a 
particular industry represents we will view this as a positive effect of the program for the 
industry that remains constant and a negative for a firm in an industry that ceases operation.  If 
we were to use the number of firms as our outcome, we would only measure the negative of the 
firm in the industry that shuts down.  The downside of using the share instead of a count is that a 
firm in one industry replacing a firm from another industry as a result of the program, would 
have an added positive effect in the replacing industry.   
5. RESULTS ACROSS INDUSTRY SECTORS 
5.1 Establishment Location  
The top panel of Table 2 shows the short term effect of the location-based EZ tax 
incentives on establishment location across industry sectors.  We measure this effect by the share 
of total establishments that each industry represents in a census tract relative to the share that it 
represents in the surrounding city and compare locations that received the wage tax credit (EZ 
areas) with those that did not (EC areas).  Each row of Table 2 represents a separate regression 
that includes all two-digit SIC industries within the larger one-digit category.  The coefficient on 
the EZ variable shows the marginal effect of the tax incentives on the share of firms in each 
industry.  The constant term shows how the share of firms in each industry changed for the 
control group that did not receive the wage tax credit.
15
 
 The results shown in Table 2 are mostly consistent with the predictions from our simple 
model.  The largest positive effect from the tax incentives is in the retail industry, where the 
share of firms increased by 0.3077 percentage points, statistically different from zero at the one-
percent level.  Although the coefficient seems small in magnitude it is quite large compared to 
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the change in the control areas as shown by the constant term.  The control areas experienced a 
decline in the share of firms in the retail industry of 0.4387 percentage points, statistically 
different from zero at the one-percent level.  The change in the share of firms in the retail 
industry is also quite large with respect to the sample mean; the mean change in the share of 
retail firms was a decline of 0.01202 percentage points between 1994 and 1996. 
 The results in Table 2 also show a positive effect of the tax incentives in the service 
industry, where the share of firms increased by 0.1696 percentage points.  This result is 
statistically different from zero at the one-percent level.  The share of service industry firms in 
the control areas experienced a small decline, making the gain in EZ areas more meaningful.  
The change in the share of firms in the service industry caused by the EZ is large with respect to 
the mean change in our sample.  The mean change in the share of service firms was an increase 
of 0.20307 percentage points, indicating that areas with the tax incentives increased the share of 
firms in the service industry by about 83 percent at the mean.  The positive effect of the tax 
incentives on service firms locating in the EZ area is consistent with our models prediction. 
 The bottom panel of Table 2 presents regression results that measure the long-term effect 
of the tax incentives on industry location using 2000 as the treatment year.  The long-term results 
primarily show the same pattern, in terms of the sign of the coefficients, across industry sectors 
as the short-term results.  The largest positive effect in the long-term on the share of firms 
locating in the EZ areas is in the retail sector where the tax incentives were responsible for a 
0.2385 percentage point increase in the share of firms, statistically significant at the five percent 
level.  Overall, in the long-term, our results show that the EZ location based tax incentives were 
responsible for a shift in the composition of firms in designated areas.  The shift that we see is a 
decline in the share of firms in the transportation industry and an increase in the share of firms in 
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the retail industry.  Given our estimate of α for these sectors, this shift confirms the prediction of 
our model.  
 The results show that the tax incentives were responsible for some industries leaving the 
EZ area (as measured by the change in the share of total firms).  The decline experienced in EZ 
areas by some industries is likely the result of these firms being out-bid for land in the EZ by 
firms in industries that stand to have a larger reduction in total cost from the EZ program.  The 
decline for some industries in EZ areas is perhaps best explained in the context of the standard 
Alonzo-Mills-Muth model.
16
  In this model, the economic agents (different types of firms in this 
case) bid for land that best suits their purpose, with highest bidder winning the use of land.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to construct such a model, one could conceivably  
use the total cost reduction predicted by our simple model to adjust bids for firms in the Alonzo-
Mills-Muth framework.   
5.2 Employment at Zone Establishments 
 The top panel of Table 3 shows the short-term effect of the location-based EZ tax 
incentives on employment at firms across industry sectors.  We measure this effect by the share 
of total employment at establishments that each industry represents in a census tract relative to 
the share that it represents in the surrounding city and compare locations that received the full 
complement of tax incentives with those that did not.  Each row of Table 3 represents a separate 
regression that includes all two-digit SIC industries within the larger one-digit category.  The EZ 
variable shows the effect of the tax incentives on the share of employment at establishments in 
each industry.  The constant term shows how the share of employees in each industry changed 
for our control group that did not receive the wage tax credit. 
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 The results in Table 3 are not consistent with the basic prediction of the model that firms 
in industries with a value of α close to one-half will experience the largest change in employment 
from the tax incentives.  As we explain in the modeling section, this is likely driven by the 
geographic nature of the program incentives.  Firms in industries that benefit from the largest 
reduction in total cost will have the highest bids for land in the zone, which may push firms that 
would have substantially changed employment out of the zone.  
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows regression results for the share of employees across 
industry sectors in the long-term, or where the treatment year is 2000.  Unlike the short-term 
results, which produce estimates that are statistically indistinguishable from zero, the long-term 
results suggest a similar shifting of composition to the one we see in the share of firms in the 
area.   
5.3  Results by Value of α 
 Our model predicts a different effect from the tax incentives across values of α.  As a 
result, separating industries that have a range of α may produce meaningful differences in our 
estimates.
17
  To more precisely capture the heterogeneous effect on firms across values of α that 
our model predicts, we separate our data into quartiles according to the value of α and run 
separate regressions for each quartile.  The breakpoints that separate our data evenly are 
α=0.255, α=0.414, and α=0.628.  Table 4 shows regression results by value of α for both the 
share of establishments and employment in the long and short-term. 
 The results presented in Table 4 confirm the predictions of the model and show the effect 
of the tax incentives displayed in the previous section in greater detail.  These results highlight 
the finding that firms in industries experiencing a larger total cost reduction from the tax 
incentives benefit at the expense of those with a smaller cost reduction.  Industry sectors with a 
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value of α between 0.255 and 0.414 increase the share of establishments by 0.166 percentage 
points in the short-term (statistically significant at the one-percent level).  This effect persists 
into the long-term with a share increase of 0.157 percentage points (statistically significant at the 
one-percent level).   
Table 4 also shows that the gain for industries in the second quartile was at the expense of 
industry sectors with a value of α in the third and fourth quartiles.  The share of these industry 
sectors declined by 0.117 and 0.198 percentage points (statistically significant at the one-percent 
level), respectively in the short-term.  The loss of share for industry sectors in the third and 
fourth quartiles persists in the long-term, although only the fourth quartile results remain 
significant. 
A similar pattern exists for the share of employment across industry sectors by quartile of α.  
Industries in the second quartile increase the share of employment at the expense of those in the 
third and fourth quartiles.  In the short-term, industries in the second quartile increase the share 
of employment by almost a full percentage point (0.952) statistically significant at the one-
percent level.  Industries in the third quartile show a decline of 0.327 percentage points, 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.  Industries in the fourth quartile show the largest 
reduction in the share of employment at 0.499, statistically significant at the ten percent level.   
The pattern persists in the long-term as industry sectors in the second quartile increase the 
share of employment by more than a full percentage point.  The long-term gain for industry 
sectors in the second quartile remains at the expense of industry sectors in the third and fourth 
quartile.  Industry sectors with a value of α between 0.414 and 0.628 show a 0.738 percentage 
point decline in the share of employment, while those with an α value over 0.628 decline by 
0.598 percentage points.  
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5.4 Instrumental Variables Results 
 Our OLS results show a heterogeneous effect of location-based tax incentives across 
industry sectors and by level of capital-labor substitutability.  The OLS results, may however, be 
biased toward finding an effect of the tax incentives.  As we explain in the identification section, 
our differencing strategy leaves out any census-tract specific variables that change over time.  
This omission could bias our results if these omitted variables are correlated with the designation 
of EZ areas.  Selection of EZ areas seems to have been at least partially based on choosing areas 
that would have been economically successful even in the absence of the EZ tax incentives, see 
Hanson (2009) for a full explanation of this issue. 
 To deal with the potential for bias caused by the selection of EZ areas we follow the 
instrumental variable strategy outlined by Hanson (2009) and use congressional representation of 
areas that applied for EZ designation to explain designation of the program.  We use 
congressional representation on the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee 
as our instrument for EZ designation.  This choice is based on work by Wallace (2004) that 
shows this committee (and no others) to be a significant determinant of EZ designation.  We use 
both a dummy variable for representation on the Ways and Means committee as well as the 
number of years that the member has served on the committee as our instruments.
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The first-stage instrumental variables results are shown in Table 5.  These results suggest 
that the correlation between our instruments and the designation of an area for the EZ tax 
incentives is quite strong.  The Ways and Means member dummy variable by itself (column 1) is 
both positive and significant at the one-percent level and easily passes the instrument F-test.  The 
number of terms that the Representative served on the Ways and Means committee is even 
stronger and also easily passes the instrument F-test.  Columns 3 and 4 show results using both 
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instruments together.  Again the correlation between the instruments is strong and the 
instruments easily pass the joint F-test.
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As a further check on the validity of our instruments we run several diagnostic tests.  We 
test the over-identification restrictions (because we use two instruments), this test of the Sargon-
Hansen J-statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis that instruments are valid (p-value of 0.986).  
We test for under-identification using the Kleibergen-Paap LM-test, and easily reject the null 
hypothesis (p-value of 0.00) that our matrix is not of full column rank- a conclusion that supports 
the model as being identified.  Furthermore, our instruments are far outside of the range of the 
Stock-Yogo (2005) critical values (F-statistic of over 3100, when only 19 is required) that would 
suggest a weak identification problem- i.e. our instruments are strong enough to be considered 
strongly correlated with EZ assignment. 
On balance, the second-stage instrumental variables results confirm the results in Tables 
2-4, although some of the industry sector effects change.  Table 6 presents the short-term results 
on industry location using IV.  The only major difference between the short-term IV and the 
OLS is that the IV results suggest the manufacturing sector increased the share of firms locating 
in EZ areas, which is counter to what our model predicts given the relatively high value of α for 
that sector.  The strong positive and significant effect on the share of firms locating in EZ areas 
in the retail sector remains. 
The long-term effects on establishment location, shown in Table 6, do not match as well 
with the OLS results.  The primary difference is the estimated effect on firms in the retail 
industry sector.  The second-stage results for the share of employment across industry sectors are 
more consistent with the OLS results.  Table 7 shows that the IV estimation suggests a negative 
change for the retail industry, although this result is not statistically significant.  The sign on the 
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manufacturing sector changes to positive and this result is statistically different from zero at the 
five-percent level.  In addition, the IV results are somewhat more precise as the negative effect in 
the transportation industry is statistically significant at the ten-percent level. 
As with the OLS estimates, we divide our industries up by value of α and run separate 
instrumental variables regressions for each quartile.  Table 8 shows the instrumental variables 
results by value of α for both the share of establishments (our measure of location) and the share 
of employment in the short and long-term.  Overall, these results match quite well with our OLS 
results and in many cases show a stronger effect of the tax incentives. 
The IV results remove any selection bias from the estimation and are closer to being a purely 
causal effect of the program.  Although it is difficult to judge why some of the coefficients for 
particular industries or values of alpha are different, the methods on balance produce similar 
results.  Murray (2006) suggests that the relative bias of the estimates (IV/OLS) will be equal to 
the number of instruments divided by the product of the number of observations and the first 
stage R-squared.  This comparison method suggests that for each instrument and for the case 
where we use both instruments simultaneously, the IV results are less biased than the OLS.        
6. CONCLUSION 
 The model that we outline in this paper makes the prediction that the EZ tax credit will 
have a heterogeneous effect on the quantity of labor used and the resulting reduction in total cost 
for firms that claim it.  Tying the wage credit to the location of a firm means firms that benefit 
more from this type of incentive should out-bid firms that benefit less (in the form of reduced 
total costs).  Our empirical work demonstrates that our simple model goes a long way in 
predicting the differential effect of a location based tax incentive across industry sectors. 
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Our findings show that the federal Empowerment Zone tax incentive program is 
responsible for altering the industrial mix in areas where it is available.  Particularly, our 
estimation results show that firms in industries that our model predicts to have the largest 
reduction in total cost have an increased presence in EZ designated areas.  This increase comes at 
the expense of industries that benefit least from the program.  We find in the short-term, the 
retail and service sectors benefited most from the program, increasing the share of establishments 
in the designated area by between .16 and .30 percentage points.  These gains are offset by the 
transportation and finance, insurance, and real estate industries, which experienced a decline in 
the share of establishments by between .16 and .19 percentage points.   
 The heterogeneous effect across industry sectors that we demonstrate in this paper helps 
explain some of the tension in the previous literature.  Our research suggests that if a particular 
policy is targeted to an area with an existing base of firms that will benefit from the policy it may 
be more effective.  It also suggests that small or zero effects of particular policy could be driven 
by churning at the industry level.     
Understanding the relationship between location-based policy and industry sectors can help 
guide policy makers to choose a policy that meets their goals.  The industry level affects we 
demonstrate are not a goal of the EZ program; however, they are an important consequence.  
Policy makers should be aware of the potential for industry level churning and other unintended 
consequences of location-based tax incentives when crafting policy. 
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1
 These papers cover a range of programs including several different state-level geographically targeted tax 
incentives, often called Enterprise Zones, and papers that study the Federal Empowerment Zone program.  The 
common theme among these programs is that they define who receives benefits based on geographic location, often 
within an otherwise homogenous taxing jurisdiction (like a city or county for example).  The actual benefits afforded 
under these programs differ substantially and may not include the same benefits as the Federal Empowerment Zone 
program discussed here.  See Bondonio and Engberg (2000) and Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) for papers that 
describe and classify several state-level Enterprise Zone programs. 
2
 According to the U.S Government Accountability Office (1999), the wage tax credit is the most-used tax incentive 
by zone businesses; the IRS does not report claims for any of the other zone-related incentives besides the zone 
facility bonds. 
3
 The Boston, Oakland, Houston and Kansas City nominees were designated as Enhanced Enterprise Communities 
(EEC).  EEC status gave these communities a more generous allocation of grant funds than the standard Enterprise 
Communities.  Two nominees, Cleveland and Los Angeles, were awarded the status of Supplemental Empowerment 
Zone (SEZ) (GAO, 2004), which did not allow for all of the tax benefits of regular EZs, but included more generous 
grants than regular EZs.   
4
 For simplicity, we assume that the gross wage paid is not a function of the tax credit.  This is equivalent to 
assuming that the economic incidence of the wage tax credit falls entirely on producers.   
5
 Recall that the EZ program has no restriction on the type or tenure of the firm in the EZ area.  Any firm can claim 
the benefits as long as they operate in the EZ and hire employees who live in the EZ area.  This means that firms that 
are new to the area are available for benefits regardless of where they relocate from. 
6
 We use BEA data from 2000 at the industry level according to the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) classification of industries.  Because the NAICS industry classification does not match exactly with SIC 
industry classification, we use a correspondence from Census to match them.  The NAICS to SIC correspondence 
can be found on-line at:  http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm.  
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7
 Equipment is valued as the current value net of depreciation.  See www.bea.gov, for a description of construction 
of the private fixed assets.  This includes how the BEA estimates depreciation, service lives, and declining balance 
rates.   
8
 The EZ wage credit is by far the most used incentive in the EZ program in terms of both number of claimants and 
dollars claimed (GAO, 1999), in fact there are so few claims on the other tax incentives that the IRS does not bother 
to report on them (GAO, 1999).  EZ areas also received a larger one-time allocation of Social Service Block Grant 
funds at the start of the program than EC areas ($100 million and $3 million, respectively).  These funds were 
limited to use for day care for children, employment services, counseling, legal services, transportation, education, 
and substance abuse recovery.  Because we cannot truly separate the larger Block Grant funding from the wage tax 
credit, our coefficients should be viewed literally as the joint effect of these two benefits.       
9
 Note that ∆Yi,n - ∆Yc,n = ( Yi, n - Yi, city )1996  -  ( Yi, n-Yi, city )1994 
10
 We use the year 2000 as our long-term treatment effect year because the EZ program underwent substantial 
expansion in 2001.  At that time, some of the original EC areas (our control group) were awarded EZ status.  We do 
not use the expansion of the program in our identification strategy because the application process and choice of 
new zones is not as clearly defined as it is for the original designation.  
11
 We exclude all rural EZ areas from our analysis as they are in extremely different (both  demographically and 
economically) areas of the country.  In addition, the rural EZ areas are made up of relatively few census tracts, so 
they would not provide many additional observations. 
12
 See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a particularly lucid description of this problem. 
13
 Although the D&B does not contain all business activity in the U. S., the omissions from the data are considered 
sufficiently random so that the data is representative of the spatial distribution of the business activity (Holmes, 
1998 and Rosenthal and Strange, 2003). 
14
 To use this correspondence, we assume that the amount of business activity in a zip code is distributed randomly 
across the zip code.  This is a standard assumption in the literature and is documented in well citied papers, such as 
Holmes (1998) and Rosenthal and Strange (2003). 
15
 Our interpretation of the constant as the share of firms in each industry in control cities (the expected value of the 
dependent variable given presence in a control area before treatment) is straightforward from the Difference-in-
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Difference model.  See Madrian (1994) or Card and Krueger (1994) for prominent examples, see Angrist and Pishke 
(2009) for a full explanation of the interpretation of coefficients in a Difference-in-Difference model. 
16
 See O’Sullivan (2009) pages 121–145 for an elementary treatment of the standard Alonzo-Mills-Muth model and 
corresponding bids for land among various firms.    
17
 The value of α can differ substantially among two-digit industries within the one-digit category.  For example, in 
the broad one-digit service industry, which we assign a value of α at 0.275, the range of two-digit industry values of 
α range from a low of 0.09 (legal services) to a high of 0.42 (amusement and recreation services). 
18
 The idea of using politically related variables as instruments is not unique to our research.  Knight (2002) uses 
several politically related variables as instruments, including committee assignment of federal Representatives, for 
federal grant spending to determine crowd out effects on state and local spending.  Other studies, including Poterba 
(1994), Levitt (1997), and Kubik and Moran (2003) use the exogenous cycle of elections to explain politically 
motivated action. 
19
 The first stage instrument results are sensitive to assumptions about the spatial correlation of the error term.  If we 
cluster the standard errors in the first stage by city, we lose quite a bit of statistical power because the city level 
variation is lost.     
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Table 1: Value of α Parameter by Industry at One Digit SIC 
Level 
Industry SIC Codes Value of α 
Retail 52 - 59 0.255 
Services 70 - 89 0.275 
Construction 15 - 17 0.293 
Wholesale 50 - 51 0.409 
FIRE
a
 60 - 67 0.477 
Manufacturing 20 - 39 0.532 
Transportation 40 - 49 0.656 
Mining 10 - 14 0.737 
Agriculture 1 - 9 0.813 
Notes: 
Alpha is calculated as the ratio of capital cost of production to total (labor 
and capital) cost of production 
a) FIRE stands for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate firms. 
 
  
 
Table 2: Effect of Tax Incentives on Establishment Location, Standard Errors Clustered at the City Level Shown in 
Parenthesis 
Short 
Term Construction Manufacturing  Transportation Wholesale Retail FIRE Service 
Constant -0.001777 -0.000438** -0.000697 -0.00272*** -0.00438*** 0.001568*** -0.000173 
 
(0.001123) (0.000185) (0.000521) (0.000982) (0.00139) (0.000573) (0.000291) 
        EZ -0.000328 -0.000121 -0.001916*** 0.000525 0.003077*** -0.00391*** 0.001696*** 
 
(0.001664) (0.000312) (0.000488) (0.002646) (0.000909) (0.00083) (0.000677) 
        N 3,993 26,620 11,979 2,662 10,648 9,317 18,634 
R
2
 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.1 
        Long 
Term               
Constant -0.00177 -0.00053** -0.000335 -0.001884 -0.00456*** 0.00082* -0.000023 
 
(0.001116) (0.000232) (0.000566) (0.001196) (0.001198) (0.000462) (0.000282) 
        EZ 0.0004 0.000044 -0.002107*** 0.001484 0.002385** -0.001624 0.000316 
 
(0.001624) (0.000286) (0.000594) (0.002545) (0.000915) (0.00165) (0.000903) 
        N 3,993 26,620 11,979 2,662 10,648 9,317 18,634 
R
2
 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.13 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.   
Notes: 
(a) The pre-treatment year is 1994, the treatment year is 1996.   
(b) Unit of observation is the two digit SIC industry at the census tract level of geography. 
(c) Data on the number of firms in a given industry is from the Dunn & Bradstreet survey and is differenced to reflect our identification strategy. 
(d) The EZ variable represents designation of the federal Empowerment Zone wage tax credit at the census tract level, the coefficient on this 
variable reflects the effect of this tax incentive on the share of business establishments that locate in the area relative to the surrounding city 
compared to areas that applied for the EZ designation but were denied relative to their respective surrounding city. 
(e) The number of observations differs across industries because they have a different number of two-digit industries within the one-digit class.  All 
census tracts are represented in each industry classification. 
 
  
 
Table 3: Effect of Tax Incentives on Employment at Zone Establishments, Standard Errors Clustered at the City 
Level Shown in Parenthesis 
Short 
Term Construction Manufacturing  Transportation Wholesale Retail FIRE Service 
Constant -0.00523*** -0.001859* 0.000318 -0.001298 -0.002169 0.001969** -0.000151 
 
(0.001269) (0.001015) (0.002115) (0.001731) (0.001413) (0.000951) (0.000252) 
        EZ -0.000645 -0.000039 -0.003881 -0.001828 0.001073 0.001748 0.00025 
 
(0.00111) (0.000582) (0.002841) (0.005011) (0.001135) (0.003035) (0.001021) 
        N 3,993 26,620 11,979 2,662 10,648 9,317 18,634 
R
2
 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
        Long 
Term               
Constant -0.00569*** -0.001976** 0.001235 0.000673 -0.002595 0.000624 -0.000305 
 
(0.00151) (0.001009) (0.002173) (0.002188) (0.001634) (0.001165) (0.000293) 
        EZ 0.000333 -0.00009 -0.005069** -0.000324 0.002633*** 0.00037 0.00147 
 
(0.001085) (0.000606) (0.002414) (0.004725) (0.000803) (0.002372) (0.001261) 
        N 3,993 26,620 11,979 2,662 10,648 9,317 18,634 
R
2
 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.   
Notes: 
(a) The pre-treatment year is 1994, the treatment year is 1996.   
(b) Unit of observation is the two digit SIC industry at the census tract level of geography. 
(c) Data on the employment at establishments in a given industry is from the Dunn & Bradstreet survey and is differenced to reflect our 
identification strategy. 
(d) The EZ variable represents designation of the federal Empowerment Zone wage tax credit at the census tract level, the coefficient on this 
variable reflects the effect of this tax incentive on the share of business establishments that locate in the area relative to the surrounding city 
compared to areas that applied for the EZ designation but were denied relative to their respective surrounding city. 
(e) The number of observations differs across industries because they have a different number of two-digit industries within the one-digit class.  
All census tracts are represented in each industry classification. 
 
  
 
Table 4: Effect of Tax Incentives by Quartile Value of α, Standard Errors Clustered at the City Level Shown in 
Parenthesis 
       
 
Short Term (1994-1996) Long Term (1994-2000) 
  
 
Constant EZ Constant EZ Industries N 
Share of Establishments 
      Labor Intensive (α < 0.255) 0.0009338*** 0.0015695** 0.0009761*** 0.0005498 19 25,289 
 
(0.0002448) (0.0007107) (0.0002506) (0.0009263) 
  
       0.255 ≤ α  <0.414 -0.000917*** 0.0016673*** -0.000798*** 0.0015799*** 18 23,958 
 
(0.0002532) (0.0005167) (0.0002285) (0.0003603) 
  
       0.414 ≤ α  < 0.628 -0.0001667 -0.001176*** -0.0001912 -0.0001547 17 22,627 
 
(0.0001539) (0.0002256) (0.0001277) (0.0008395) 
  
       Capital Intensive (α ≥ 0.628) 0.0000154 -0.001988*** -0.0001119* -0.001931*** 19 25,289 
 
(0.0000709) (0.0004013) (0.0000576) (0.0003942) 
  
       Share of Employment 
      Labor Intensive (α <  0.255) 0.0010014 0.0007788 -0.000256 0.0039061 19 25,289 
 
(0.0011724) (0.0018374) (0.0012971) (0.002752) 
  
       0.255 ≤ α  <  0.414 -0.0012115 0.0095212*** 0.0001686 0.0108422*** 18 23,958 
 
(0.0012353) (0.0035501) (0.0012554) (0.0039071) 
  
       0.414 ≤ α  <  0.628 -0.0001707 -0.0032705* 0.0009908 -0.007387*** 17 22,627 
 
(0.001112) (0.002542) (0.0011834) (0.0023127) 
  
       Capital Intensive (α ≥  0.628) 0.0005217 -0.0049987* 0.0001249 -0.0059877** 19 25,289 
 
(0.0006873) (0.003074) (0.000723) (0.0026487) 
  
       *** indicates statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.   
Notes: 
(a) The pre-treatment year is 1994; the treatment year for the short term is 1996 and is 2000 for the long term.   
(b) Unit of observation is the two digit SIC industry at the census tract level of geography. 
(c) Data on the share of firms in a given industry is from the Dunn & Bradstreet survey and is differenced as shown in equation 1 to reflect our 
identification strategy. 
(d) The EZ variable represents designation of the federal Empowerment Zone wage tax credit at the census tract level, the coefficient on this 
variable reflects the effect of this tax incentive on the share of business establishments that locate in the area relative to the surrounding city 
compared to areas that applied for the EZ designation but were denied relative to their respective surrounding city. 
  
 
Table 5: First Stage IV:  Dependent Variable is EZ Designation, Standard Errors Shown in 
Parenthesis  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ways and Means Member 0.1416***    
 
-0.2589*** -0.2589*** 
 
(0.0033)    
 
(.0061)    (.0061)   
Number of Terms on Committee 
 
0.0224*** 0.0445*** 0.0445*** 
  
(.0004) (.0006) (.0006)     
Constant 0.1826 0.1727 0.1826 0.1826 
 
(0.0013)    (0.0013) (0.0013)   (0.0109)    
     Industry fixed effects no no no yes 
N 105149 105149 105149 105149 
R
2
 0.0169 0.0443 0.0573 0.0573 
     Instrument F-test (1,105147) 1804.36 4870.23 
  P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 
  Instrument F-test 
(2,105146)/(2,105068) 
  
3115.81 3113.5 
P-Value 
  
0.0000 0.0000 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.   
Notes: 
(a) Information about congressional committee assignment and years of service comes from http://clerk.house.gov/.  
We match this to census tract geography using the Mable/Geocorr database online at 
http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr90.shtml   
(b) Unit of observation is the two digit SIC industry at the census tract level of geography. 
(c) We also run the first stage by clustering standard errors at the SIC 2 digit level, this decreases our standard errors 
on the instrument parameters and does not change the fact that they pass the instrument F test. 
 
  
 
Table 6: Instrumental Variable Estimates for Effect of Tax Incentives on Establishment Location, Standard Errors 
Clustered at the City Level Shown in Parenthesis 
Short 
Term Construction Manufacturing  Transportation Wholesale Retail FIRE Service 
Constant -0.000952 -0.000743** 0.00023 -0.00726** -0.00476*** 0.002853** -0.000299 
 
(0.001552) (0.000319) (0.0006) (0.003579) (0.00135) (0.001125) (0.000522) 
        EZ -0.004331* 0.001363** -0.006419*** 0.022578* 0.004913** -0.01015*** 0.002307 
 
(0.00266) (0.000633) (0.001274) (0.012452) (0.002061) (0.002704) (0.002011) 
        N 3,993 26,620 11,979 2,662 10,648 9,317 18,634 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
        Long 
Term               
Constant -0.000668 -0.000852** 0.00085 -0.005497 -0.00424*** -0.001205 0.000724 
 
(0.001672) (0.000361) (0.000805) (0.003222) (0.001392) (0.00113) (0.000563) 
        EZ -0.004949 0.001611*** -0.007862*** 0.019034* 0.000802 0.008212*** -0.003315 
 
(0.003188) (0.000573) (0.002091) (0.010945) (0.002141) (0.002768) (0.003315) 
        N 3,993 26,620 11,979 2,662 10,648 9,317 18,634 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.13 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.   
Notes: 
(a) The pre-treatment year is 1994, the treatment year is 1996.   
(b) Unit of observation is the two digit SIC industry at the census tract level of geography. 
(c) Data on the number of firms in a given industry is from the Dunn & Bradstreet survey and is differenced to reflect our identification strategy. 
(d) The EZ variable represents designation of the federal Empowerment Zone wage tax credit at the census tract level, the coefficient on this 
variable reflects the effect of this tax incentive on the share of business establishments that locate in the area relative to the surrounding city 
compared to areas that applied for the EZ designation but were denied relative to their respective surrounding city. 
 
  
 
Table 7: Instrumental Variable Estimates for Effect of Tax Incentives on Employment at Zone Establishments, 
Standard Errors Clustered at the City Level Shown in Parenthesis 
Short 
Term Construction Manufacturing  Transportation Wholesale Retail FIRE Service 
Constant -0.00359 -0.002468* 0.000814 -0.001198 -0.001363 0.001449 0.000639 
 
(0.002507) (0.001338) (0.002801) (0.003244) (0.001918) (0.001473) (0.00068) 
        EZ -0.008633 0.002921** -0.006288* -0.002313 -0.002845 0.004272 -0.003584 
 
(0.009202) (0.001347) (0.003523) (0.008837) (0.005686) (0.005608) (0.002733) 
        N 3,993 26,620 11,979 2,662 10,648 9,317 18,634 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
        Long 
Term               
Constant -0.003679 -0.00276** 0.001688 0.000845 -0.002595 -0.001298 0.001259 
 
(0.002672) (0.001339) (0.002794) (0.003728) (0.00181) (0.001981) (0.001093) 
        EZ -0.009475 0.003718** -0.007267 -0.00116 0.002635 0.009708 -0.006127 
 
(0.009119) (0.001726) (0.005283) (0.011145) (0.002671) (0.007105) (0.004676) 
        N 3,993 26,620 11,979 2,662 10,648 9,317 18,634 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
*** indicates statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.   
Notes: 
(a) The pre-treatment year is 1994, the treatment year is 1996.   
(b) Unit of observation is the two digit SIC industry at the census tract level of geography. 
(c) Data on the employment at establishments in a given industry is from the Dunn & Bradstreet survey and is differenced to reflect our 
identification strategy. 
(d) The EZ variable represents designation of the federal Empowerment Zone wage tax credit at the census tract level, the coefficient on this 
variable reflects the effect of this tax incentive on the share of business establishments that locate in the area relative to the surrounding city 
compared to areas that applied for the EZ designation but were denied relative to their respective surrounding city. 
 
  
 
Table 8: Instrumental Variables Results for Effect of Tax Incentives by Quartile Value of α, Standard Errors 
Clustered at the City Level Shown in Parenthesis 
       
 
Short Term (1994-1996) Long Term (1994-2000) 
  
 
Constant EZ Constant EZ Industries N 
Share of Establishments 
      Labor Intensive (α < 0.255) 0.0007363 0.0012848 0.0009665 -0.0004801 19 25,289 
 
(0.0016398) (0.0046035) (0.0017564) (0.0041324) 
  
       0.255 ≤ α  <0.414 -0.0019239 0.013775*** -0.001808 0.0160091*** 18 23,958 
 
(0.0015701) (0.0036558) (0.0017555) (0.004476) 
  
       0.414 ≤ α  < 0.628 -0.0008055 -0.0012747 0.0004987 -0.005523* 17 22,627 
 
(0.0011803) (0.0044466) (0.0010834) (0.0033097) 
  
       Capital Intensive (α ≥ 0.628) 0.0009427 -0.00596* -0.000616 -0.0021696 19 25,289 
 
(0.0009505) (0.0034217) (0.0010284) (0.0032361) 
  
       Share of Employment 
      Labor Intensive (α <  0.255) 0.000894 0.0013006 0.0020971 -0.0075229 19 25,289 
 
(0.0023401) (0.008543) (0.0030668) (0.0160945) 
  
       0.255 ≤ α  <  0.414 -0.0040472* 0.0232961*** 0.0000685 0.0113284 18 23,958 
 
(0.0022985) (0.0078541) (0.0023079) (0.0093506) 
  
       0.414 ≤ α  <  0.628 0.0008015 -0.0079927** -0.0001871 -0.0016657 17 22,627 
 
(0.0015549) (0.0033647) (0.0020959) (0.0108323) 
  
       Capital Intensive (α ≥  0.628) 0.0011636 -0.0081173 -0.0019499 0.0040925 19 25,289 
 
(0.0029371) (0.0138673) (0.0021172) (0.0075291) 
  
       *** indicates statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, * at 10 percent level.   
Notes: 
(a) The pre-treatment year is 1994; the treatment year for the short term is 1996 and is 2000 for the long term.  Unit of observation is the two digit 
SIC industry at the census tract level of geography. 
(b) Data on the share of firms in a given industry is from the Dunn & Bradstreet survey and is differenced as shown in equation 1 to reflect our 
identification strategy.  Second stage results are reported using both instruments. 
  
 
